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beliefs on social progress ; but the problem for its solution would need a wider and more careful study of history than is shown in this volume, and a greater absence of false abstractions, arbitrary assumptions, and hasty generalizations.

D. G. RITCHIE.

OXFORD.

ETHICS OF CITIZENSHIP. John MacCunn, M.A., Professor of Philosophy, University College, Liverpool. Glasgow: MacLehose & Sons, 1894.

This is a timely book. When we are being flooded in response to a popular demand with hand-books on the Duties of Citizenship, it is well to have the subject treated from a wider point of view by so competent a writer as Professor MacCunn has shown himself to be. "The object of the following pages," he tells us in the Preface, "is to connect some leading aspects of democratic citizenship with ethical facts and beliefs."

In the first Essay, which is upon "Equality," the key-note is struck. The abstract equality of the French Revolution is set aside. "Those who attempt to level" (quoting Burke) "never equalize." The ground of equal legal and political rights is found in the germ of human Worth which is latent in every rational soul. If there is a ground for the so-called social right of the individual to have deliverance from the conditions of degrading poverty secured to him it must be looked for in the same direction. The second Essay is upon "Fraternity," for which, threatened though it is by the intensified competition of modern times, the writer finds guarantees in the family and the Greek virtue of friendship (these private affections, he finely says, must not be thought of as spending themselves where they rise, but are "like waves that break in unexpected music upon shores that knew nothing of the winds that raised them") in the humanitarian feeling which emancipated the negro slave at the cost of £20,000,000, and in the growing sense of industrial dependence of one class, and even one country and continent on another. In the third Essay, upon the "Rights of Man," Mr. MacCunn carries his principle a step further. A right is regarded as a claim whether recognized by law or not put forward in the name, not of what man is or has been, but of what, under favorable circumstances, he may become. As against the leaders of the French Revolution, Bentham was right in demanding a utilitarian justification of the rights that were claimed ; Burke,

in denouncing the crude individualism of men who, after they had spent their force of assertion, appealed, for lack of reasons, to force of arms and "argued in ultimatums;" Malthus, in trying to turn men's eyes from claims of rights to the conditions of subsistence—but underlying the fanaticism of the revolutionists and surviving all the attacks upon them lay the unconquerable conviction of an individual human worth that court decorations were powerless to give or social oppression to take away. The fourth Essay, on "Citizenship," further emphasizes the truth that to possess rights is not to be a citizen. Rights are the beginning, not the end of citizenship. Beyond them lies the duty to fit ourselves to use them. True freedom is freedom to perform this duty. The exercise of the right is merely the last step in making this developed worth effective in society. Rousseau, who maintained that Englishmen were free only at the moment of going to the poll (he added that they then used their freedom so badly that they deserved to lose it), states precisely the reverse of the truth, "for the stuff and substance of freedom we must look to the weeks and months and years that lie in the intervals when we are *not* electing members of Parliament." On p. 32, the objection to giving votes founded upon the unfitness of their possessors to exercise them is well met. Essay V. puts the case for the "Rule of the Majority" against the common objections, including Mill's; Essay VI. defends its machinery of "Party" on the usual grounds, but with a forcible and suggestive application to present English politics. But the most serious contributions towards the solution of current problems are to be found in Essays VII. and VIII. The former discusses, in close and suggestive connection with Aristotle's doctrine of *φρόνησις*, the "Elements of Political Consistency," in which lie the author's hopes for the future of Democracy. They are three: 1. Enlightenment, by which as he explains, he means "an ideal of our country's Future,—a conception or picture of what in our most reflective moments we wish our country to be." 2. "Deliberation," or the insight by which, in the face of competing alternatives, the right means are securely linked to the chosen end, the isolated decision of the hour riveted on the strong chain of settled policy. 3. But these are intellectual conditions, and of themselves are insufficient. Selfish or sinister interest may betray the cleverest of politicians. To knowledge and deliberation we must add Disinterestedness. With an enlarged idea of education to help to secure the first two, and the spirit of honor and self-surrender to secure the last, Professor

MacCunn is ready to meet the enemy of Democracy in the gate. But just here comes the difficulty, for is it not the contention of the most recent and powerful critics of Democracy that the moral and intellectual movement of which it is the outcome make steadily against the last and most essential of the above conditions? But Mr. MacCunn has an answer for the prophets of decay in national life and character. He admits that Religion is necessary to counteract the "virtuous materialism" which De Tocqueville foreboded. It is needed to stimulate the sense of individual responsibility, to nerve to resist the "tyranny of the majority," and to inspire the citizen to work for distant and unseen ends. But he refuses to admit that religion is threatened by the intellectual movement of which Democracy is part outcome and part cause. Historic criticism and rational philosophy are not the enemies, but the friends of religion and the higher morality. The Christian ideal of human excellence is only the brighter for the removal of scholastic obscurities, while Modern Philosophy sets itself the task not of exploding ideals, but of finding a basis for them in reason, so that "there is not a peasant or a dock laborer to whom it has not its message." It is this cheery optimism combined with a masterly familiarity with the best literature on the subject which gives freshness and charm to Professor MacCunn's treatment of these problems. One might have asked from him some clearer indication of the line his Philosophy would take in seeking to justify to Reason the ideals of the higher morality, but we cannot look for everything in two hundred and twenty pages, and this notice might have begun and ended in praise had it not been for the last Essay, which seems to call for a word of criticism.

This Essay hardly seems to belong to the preceding argument. It is upon a new subject,—viz., "Luxury," nor does it seem to add anything of sufficient value to that to justify its inclusion. It has, moreover, other defects. It starts from no principle or definition of what constitutes luxury. Professor MacCunn is not unaware, as he clearly shows, that the justification of all expenditure over and above what is necessary for bare existence must always be the satisfaction of permanent and rational wants. But he fails to apply this principle consistently to the subject on hand, and permits himself some inconclusive reasoning as to the limits within which "luxury" is justifiable. Thus, when he suggests their *durableness* as a test of the more legitimate forms of luxury, he lays himself open to the retort that it is the permanency of the

want not of the instrument which satisfies it which is here the test. It is a poor justification of a pleasure yacht that it can be turned into a fishing smack (rather a poor one, surely) after its racing or cruising days are done. It might even be claimed that the less enduring has the advantage over the more enduring in that it does not remain a monument of folly. Similar obligations are suggested by a second test which he proposes, that of the selfishness or unselfishness in the use to which a luxury is put. It is surely no justification for indulging unreasonable desires in one's self that one encourages them in others as well.

But all this lies outside the scope of Professor MacCunn's main argument, which deserves the careful study, not only of the student of political philosophy, but of any one who, whether radical or conservative, would understand the "Case for Democracy."

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

"SCIENCE AND EDUCATION." Essays by T. H. Huxley. Macmillan & Co., 1893.

So prominent is the position occupied by Professor Huxley in the forefront of the intellectual life of the day, that the issue of a collected edition of his works, vol. iii. of which is the object of the present notice, will be eagerly welcomed by both the literary and the scientific student. The versatility of the author, his singularly lucid exposition, his brilliant and incisive style, and, when occasion arises, his masterly polemic—all contribute to invest with exceptional interest everything that comes from his pen. To the school-master, the volume under consideration will come with additional emphasis at a time when we are rapidly nearing that general organization of our secondary education which we are told is now "the one thing needful." However much we may differ from Professor Huxley in the value to be attached to the cult of science, and in the position he would give to his own subject in the curriculum of our schools, his views are so broad, and his experience is so great, that whatever he has to say on this topic carries unusual weight. And further, his enthusiasm is so lofty, that he is certain to enrich and adorn what has of late years become a rather threadbare subject of discussion, and to raise it to a distinctly higher level by the sheer force of thought that he brings to bear on what he has been inculcating "in season and out of season" for more